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*AN INTRODUCTORY WORD ON NIETZSCHE*<sup>1</sup>

WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

According to Professor Riehl of Berlin, the most widely read of serious writers in Germany today is Nietzsche.<sup>2</sup> German ideas require time to cross the Channel and still more time to reach America; but already translations of Nietzsche's numerous works are appearing in England, and within three or four years three books have been devoted to him in this country. Probably ere-long the thoughtful among us will have to attend to him, as we have had to attend to other German writers in the past. As yet very confused ideas are current about him; his disciples are more or less confused themselves. Nietzsche once half-humorously remarked that the first disciples of a doctrine really prove nothing against it.

Moreover, Nietzsche was a lonely, markedly individual thinker, caring more to express himself than to be comprehended by the ordinary reader, soliloquizing much; and he said many things that, unless we carefully, patiently attend, may mislead, have misled. I could easily quote passages from him that would offend you, as they did me when I first came upon them. No one needs to be studied more before he is judged. No one lends himself less to impressionist treatment, which is all he ordinarily gets from non-Continental writers.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, I sometimes think that Nietzsche is a philosopher for philosophers and a moralist for moralists rather than for the common run of us, so subtle is his thinking, such an acquaintance with the history and refinements of philosophical and ethical speculation does he presuppose.

Accordingly, it may be most useful, as well as most conformable to my abilities, to cover a quite limited field this morning; and

<sup>1</sup> An address to the Harvard Divinity Alumni Association, 19 June, 1912.

<sup>2</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *der Künstler und der Denker* (4th ed.), p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Some of the exceptions are the late William Wallace, Professor Pringle-Pattison, Mr. A. W. Benn, Havelock Ellis, our own Dr. Everett, Professor Thilly, and, *mirabile dictu*, two women, Dr. Grace N. Dolson and Miss Emily S. Hamblen.

I shall content myself, after giving a few facts about his life and a very general characterization of him, to portray somewhat in detail his state of mind during one—the first—period of his career. What I say may thus serve as a kind of introduction to the subject; and happy shall I be if I interest any one sufficiently to take it up on his own account.

Nietzsche was the son of a Protestant pastor (indeed he came from a line of them), and was born in 1844 in Röcken, a small Prussian village. He had the best and strictest of school training at Naumburg and Schulpforta; at Schulpforta beginning a lifelong friendship with Paul Deussen, since well known as an authority on Hindu philosophy, a disciple of Schopenhauer, and now professor at Kiel. At twenty he entered the University of Bonn, removing later, with his "great" teacher, the philologist Ritschl, to Leipzig. His university studies were only interrupted by a period of military service. At twenty-four (in 1868) he was made professor of classical philology at Basel, becoming Ordinarius two years later. He also undertook work in the Pädagogium, or higher Gymnasium, of the city. Eight years later he was obliged on account of ill-health to relinquish his duties at the Pädagogium, and two years after, in 1878, he resigned, for the same reason, his university position as well. To his sister, who saw him in the spring following, he was hardly recognizable, "*ein gebrochener, müder, gealterter Mann.*" He was then thirty-five. His subsequent life was more or less spent in search of health; summers ordinarily in the Upper Engadine, winters on the Riviera. He lasted for ten years, when he had a stroke of paralysis, which affected his brain. His natural bodily vigor kept him alive for eleven years more, progressive paralysis ending in death in 1900.

Perhaps a special word should be said of Nietzsche's insanity. It came suddenly, with the paralytic stroke I have mentioned. There are no real evidences of it before. A commentary on the state of American criticism with relation to Nietzsche is furnished by the fact that two of our books are prefaced with likenesses of him after he was hopelessly deranged. All his work—sixteen volumes in the octavo edition—was done before insanity came on. That there are traces or warnings of it in any of these volumes is

at best a subjective opinion; in fact, it is a position that tends to be abandoned more and more.<sup>4</sup> Highly wrought Nietzsche often was, particularly in his latest writings; he said extravagant things and uttered violent judgments. So did Carlyle; so have many earnest, lonely men, struggling unequally with their time; but insanity is another matter.

The causes of his break-down were manifold. In attempting to mount a restive horse, when serving his time in the Prussian artillery, he suffered a serious rupture and was incapacitated for further service. Later he attached himself to the ambulance-corps of his country during the Franco-Prussian War (he could not be a soldier, as he was then living, and had become naturalized, in Switzerland), and had dangerous attacks of cholera and diphtheria, which were treated with strong medicines that deranged his stomach. Eye-troubles (he was always near-sighted) still further complicated the situation. Sick-headaches and insomnia became more or less chronic. His sleeplessness drove him to the use of drugs, and more and more powerful ones. All the time he was living the intensest intellectual life. This state of high tension, along with the other causes, seems sufficient to account for the final collapse.

By nature he was of vigorous constitution. He had been fond as a boy of swimming and skating, and at the university, until his disablement, he was an active horseback-rider. At Bonn he was described as a "picture of health and strength, broad-shouldered, brown, with rather fair thick hair, and exactly the same height as Goethe."<sup>5</sup> He was clean both in person and in thought. At school the boys called him "the little parson," instinctively repressing coarse language in his presence. He had a brief taste of dissipation at the university, but seemed to sicken of it. The delights of beer-drinking and duelling palled on him; and his openly expressed dissatisfaction with the "beer-materialism" (as he called it) and the strained relations with his fellow-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Karl Joël, *Nietzsche und die Romantik*, p. 328; H. Liestinberger, *La Philosophie de Nietzsche*, pp. 83 ff.; R. Richter, *Friedrich Nietzsche* (2d ed.), pp. 91 ff.; H. Vaihinger, *Nietzsche als Philosoph*, p. 16; Ernst Horneffer, *Nietzsches letztes Schaffen*, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Havelock Ellis, *Affirmations*, p. 11, quotes this.

students that ensued, appear to have had something to do with his leaving Bonn for Leipzig. Once he allowed himself to be taken to a house of questionable character, but was soon speechless before what he saw there. For a moment he turned to the piano, and then left.<sup>6</sup> Deussen says of him, "*mulierem nunquam attigit*"; and though this may be too absolute a claim,<sup>7</sup> it shows the impression that was left on one of his most intimate friends. He was never married. He had, however, intimate relations with gifted women, like Frau Cosima Wagner and Malwida von Meysenberg, and his family-affections were strong and tender; so tender toward his mother that he strove to keep his writings from her for fear of giving her pain. He had a nature at bottom sympathetic. No attentive reader can fail to feel this. If he warned against pity, it was as much because he had felt the excess of it as for lack of it. In personal intercourse he showed marked politeness, and, it is said, an almost feminine mildness. All his life he was practically a poor man. He called it his happiness that he owned no house, saying "*Wer besitzt wird besetzt*"; liked to wait on himself; despised the dinners of the rich; and loved solitude, aside from a few friends and the common people. The sight of the latter, he said, was as necessary to him as that of strong and healthy vegetation; and some of them in the later days of his illness and comparative emaciation in Geneva spoke endearingly of him as "*il piccolo santo*." He had remarkable strength of will. Once, as a school-boy, when the story of Mucius Scaevola was being discussed, he lighted a number of matches on his hand and held out his arm without wincing. He asserted himself against his later illnesses and depression in extraordinary fashion; and when he became mentally and spiritually disillusioned, he wrested strength from his very deprivations.<sup>8</sup> In general, there was an unusual firmness in his moral texture. He despised meanness, untruthfulness, cowardice, cunning; he liked straight speaking and straight thinking. He did not have one philosophy for the closet and another for life, as Schopenhauer

<sup>6</sup> It is Nietzsche's own story, as narrated by P. Deussen, *Erinnerungen an F. Nietzsche*, p. 24.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Möbius, Nietzsche, p. 50.

<sup>8</sup> Also *Sprach Zarathustra*, p. 163.

more or less did, but his thoughts were motives, rules. In his thinking itself we seem to catch the pulse-beats of his virile will.<sup>9</sup> Noble in spirit he was, too. One of his sayings is, "A sufferer has no right to pessimism";<sup>10</sup> the thought being, of course, that such an one is too likely to be biassed by the personal point of view. Nor is he always dogmatic. At the close of the first book of his second or sceptical period, he asks his youthful readers not to take his doctrines at once as a guide of life, but rather as theses to be weighed; he throws the responsibility on them, urging them to be true to themselves even against him. Elsewhere he says:

"It lureth thee, my mode and speech?  
Thou followest me, to hear me teach?  
Nay! Guide thyself—honest and fair—  
And follow me, with care! with care!"<sup>11</sup>

Well aware that his doctrine was a kind of adventure, he tells us, "This is my way, what is yours? *The way there is not.*" "It belongs to the humanity of a teacher," he declares, "to warn his pupils against himself"; yes, a pupil badly recompenses his teacher, when he is always pupil and nothing more.<sup>12</sup> His ideal for the thinker as such appears in these lines:

"Destined, O star, for radiant path,  
No claim on thee the darkness hath!  
Roll on in bliss through this our age!  
Its trouble ne'er shall thee engage!  
In furthest worlds thy beams shall glow:  
Pity, as sin, thou must not know!  
Be pure: that duty's all you owe."<sup>13</sup>

Yes, Nietzsche was aware that the thinker might contradict himself, as he himself did more or less in the successive periods of his mental evolution. "This thinker," he once says, evidently alluding to himself, "needs no one to confute him; he suffices to that end himself." Nor did he wish to be kept from following his own

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Riehl, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

<sup>10</sup> *Vermischte Meinungen u. s. w.*, (Vorrede, p. 5).

<sup>11</sup> *Werke* (Pock. ed.), VI, p. 42, (tr. by Thomas Common).

<sup>12</sup> *Zarathustra*, p. 114.

<sup>13</sup> *Werke* (Pock. ed.), VI, p. 56, (tr. by Thomas Common).

path by friendly defence or adulation. One must needs, he said, not only love one's enemies, but be able to hate one's friends. In short, there was a kind of unworldliness about him. Vanity he had little of; reputation, save among the selectest few, he cared little for; personal resentments, such as Schopenhauer cherished, he was incapable of. I do not mean that his language is not severe at times, even unwarrantably so; but he tells us almost pathetically in one place that we must not underscore these passages, and that the severity and presumption come partly from his isolation. A lonely thinker, who finds no sympathy or echo for his ideas, involuntarily raises his pitch, he says, and easily falls into irritated speech.<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps I should add that the aphoristic form of much of his later writing has partly a physical explanation. He was able to write only at intervals, putting down his thoughts at auspicious moments, oftenest when he was out on his walks or climbing. One year he had, he tells us, two hundred sick days. Such ill fortune was extreme, but he was more or less incapacitated every year.

Yet, despite the fragmentary nature of his work, Nietzsche was, one feels, a genuine thinker. He cannot of course be put into the same class with Aristotle or Kant; he is not systematic enough; his ideas, save in instances, are not sufficiently reasoned out. And yet he is more of a thinker (I mean more analytically and critically so) than writers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Carlyle, or Emerson. He has reasoned and deep-going opinions on almost the whole range of human interests, including metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, art, religion, politics. It was the tendency at first to take Nietzsche as an artist, a man of letters, a "stylist" (to use a barbarous word imported from the German). Now he is often spoken of as a prophet. He once betrayed what he thought of style, when he said that the only way to improve it is to improve the thought. And as to prophecy, he was too remorselessly critical, too much concerned with ideas as such, to come exclusively under that category. The fact is, he was thinker *par excellence*; and had he known better how to work and

<sup>14</sup> I borrow here from Riehl, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

how not to work, or even had he lived ten years longer, he might have justified the title of systematic thinker, for he was engaged at the time of his collapse on a work, *Der Wille zur Macht*, that was to present in elaborate scientific form his total view of things. There are, as it is, fragments enough of this work to fill a stout volume and a half.

And now, before attempting a partial portrait of the initial stage of his mental evolution, let me note the fact that his determination when a lad was to be a pastor, like his father and his grandfather, and that when he matriculated at Bonn, it was as student of philosophy and theology. It was only as his doubts increased or came to a head that he abandoned the study of theology, and something of the temper of religion remained with him always. His mind was essentially reverential. And here is the explanation of his craving for men beyond the men we know, higher men, superman (whatever the phrase is), something to satisfy, however inadequately, the instinct for the great and divine.

I have spoken of his mental "evolution"; and it is one of the most characteristic things about Nietzsche that he was a changing, evolutionary being, as contrasted with his master Schopenhauer, whose views crystallized when he was still young and never materially altered. First he was under the spell of Schopenhauer and of Wagner (Schopenhauer on the philosophical side, Wagner on the artistic), and, I might add, of the anti-Socratic Greek view of life, as he understood it. Later he became disillusioned about Wagner, more or less turned against Schopenhauer, was appreciative of Socrates and his rationalism, admired Voltaire and English positive science. It was his analytical, rationalistic, positivistic, many would say sober period, in which he dissected most of all his own earlier ideals, or, to use a phrase of his, laid them on ice. Last of all came a fresh idealism, sobered indeed and relieved of some of its early features, but none the less real and with magnificent forecasts. Nietzsche may be more interesting on account of this vivid life-history, but he is also more difficult of comprehension; we cannot always say, so Nietzsche thought, but so he thought at a certain time. And yet the later periods cannot be understood without an acquaint-



ance with the earlier, and I must doubt whether one can understand him at all without an acquaintance with his masters, Schopenhauer before all.

And now let me endeavor to bring before you in some measure Nietzsche's initial state of mind. He is professor at Basel. He is kindly treated by his colleagues. Particularly is he happy in the friendship of Jacob Burckhardt, authority on Greek culture and on the Renaissance. Happy is he also in a friendship with Wagner, with whom and Frau Cosima he often spends delightful week-ends at their villa above Lake Lucerne. His lectures are strictly professional. He had specialized, I should perhaps have said, in Greek philology, and only the few devoted to philological study attend his lectures.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time his interests are wide and he has an ideal beyond the training of capable philologists.<sup>16</sup> Occasionally he gives a public lecture, and now and then a little book or pamphlet appears from him. In these we find his ideas and ideals in general. A new note is struck, a fresh stream of thought seems to be forming itself, even his interpretation of Greek life is more or less novel; feeling, passion, strong preferences and aversions, make themselves heard and felt. He sees in Socrates the beginning of the rationalistic spirit that killed Greek tragedy. He writes about *David Strauss und Andere Philister*; and this polemic from a new point of view against an honored name makes a veritable stir in the intellectual world. *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* appears, and "On the Use and Harm of History for Life," and "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth." "*Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*" he calls them, i.e. considerations not in harmony

<sup>15</sup> Burckhardt said of him at the time that Basel had never before had a teacher like him (Lon Andreas-Salomé, Friedrich Nietzsche, in seinen Werken, p. 8).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Werke (Pock. ed.), I, xxviii. Nietzsche had an early antipathy to those who dissolve themselves into "reine Wissenschaft" (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 3). The "historische Sinn," so extensively cultivated in Germany at the time, struck him as almost a "Krankheit" (Werke, Pock. ed., II, xli). He reflects at length (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 3) on the "Selbstsucht der Wissenschaft," i.e. of the learned class, as one of the forces, "von denen zwar die Cultur gefördert wird, ohne dass man doch ihr Ziel, die Erzeugung des Genius, anerkennt." He even says, "Ein Gelehrter kann nie ein Philosoph werden" (he means by this "not merely a great thinker but an actual man." Cf. what is said of Kant, Ibid., p. 7).

with the spirit of the time. It is a young fiery spirit that expresses itself, Professor Riehl remarks. A friend who visited him in Basel in 1872 says he appeared "fiery, elastic, self-conscious, like a young lion."

As I have said, he is a disciple of Schopenhauer. As a student at Leipzig he had chanced on his works. After he read one page, he knew he must read the whole, he felt Schopenhauer's full charm. It is interesting to see that Schopenhauer did not depress him. As against the scepticism and despair which Kant had bred in a man like Heinrich von Kleist,<sup>17</sup> Schopenhauer was to him a leader who took one up to the heights of the tragic view, with the heavens and infinite stars overhead. He gave him, he says, a view of the world as a whole, opened up to him the meaning of life, and made him feel the true consolation for one's individual limitations and sorrows, namely, in renouncing self and giving one's self up to noble aims, above all to justice and pity.<sup>18</sup> He echoed the words of Schopenhauer: "A happy life is impossible. The highest to which man can attain is a heroic course of life." This was to him a kind of battle-note. In seeking for happiness, he says, we do not go beyond the animal; yes, all our restless moving to and fro on the earth, our building of cities and states, our waging of wars, our restless accumulating and spending, our running amuck at people, our copying them,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the *Quarterly Review* (Oct., 1896, p. 310): "Reason, made suddenly aware of its own impotence, so Nietzsche felt, would drive thoughtful men towards the wilderness in which, for example, Heinrich von Kleist had done himself to death." Kant, it must be remembered, reached the conclusion that we know nothing of things as they exist in themselves, our mind putting its shaping hand on every object; so that the world as we conceive it and the world as it really exists are separated by an impassable barrier. [Cf. the summary statement of O. Külpe, "Outer experience is bound up with space, inner experience with time, and they can be thought only in and through categories (space, time, and the categories being alike subjective, according to Kant). And so all realities of the several sciences, nature as well as soul, become phenomena. The knowing mind places on every object its stamp" (*Philosophical Review*, Jan., 1912, p. 8).]

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. Cf. the description of his feelings after first reading *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*: "Here there met me the full, unselfish, sunlit gaze of art; here I saw sickness and healing, exits and a haven of refuge, hell and heaven" (Professor Pringle-Pattison's translation from the *Leben*, in "Man's Place in the Cosmos," 2d ed., p. 259).

our outwitting one another and trampling on one another, our cries in need and our shouts of joy in victory—all this, he says, is only continuation of our animality. It is, in a way, a picture of nine tenths of the content of human history; not only of the barbaric world, but of the world as it has now been going on for some two thousand years since the birth of Christ, yes, as it is going on at the present moment. Nietzsche at this time sees chiefly pain in it—pain, illusion, disappointment; he discovers little sense in it. The will plunges aimlessly forward, and does not know itself or the higher aims for which it exists. The world—this greater part of the world, that is—is to him full of gloom and contradiction. At bottom there is something terrible about it and something absurd. The terrible thing is that we live on one another; that forgetting our essential unity, imagining we are separate individuals, we prey on one another. Our human world is like the world outside. Animals prey on plants, we prey on animals; yes, animals prey on one another, and we men prey on one another. It seems to be a part of the order of things, the price of individual existence. A certain violence and wrong cleaves to life. This is the foundation of Nietzsche's tragic view of the world, as it was of Schopenhauer's. It is a mistake to think of Nietzsche originally, as of Schopenhauer, as having only the wish to put a slight thereby on morality. Both (Schopenhauer always and Nietzsche at the beginning) take their stand with morality, and it is life, not morality, that is put in the wrong. As Nietzsche afterward put it, "Before the court of morals (particularly Christian, i.e. absolute morals) *must* life forever and unavoidably be in the wrong, since life is essentially something unmoral."<sup>19</sup> It is this fact, that morality and right are violated in life, that makes the world to him enigmatic and terrible. It is the fight for existence and the necessities it imposes that are the terrible things. Only a sensitive, a profoundly moral nature would feel in this way. Hegel did not feel so; Bismarck did not; our masters in political economy (till recently) have not; nine tenths of the world do not. Commonly, men see nothing more immoral in fighting for existence, whether with animals or with one another, than the

<sup>19</sup> Versuch einer Selbstkritik, p. 5, prefixed to a 2d ed. of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*.

South saw in subjecting slaves to their masters, or than the ancient Greeks in making slaves of those they conquered.

Yet Nietzsche says (and here his view grows more tragic still), not only do we prey on one another, but we must; must, not merely for selfish ends, but to attain the things that make life worth while. By implication he asserts that the very means by which we rise above the sphere of animality, just described, are immoral means. For what are the things that make life worth while? Nietzsche answers, with Schopenhauer, philosophic contemplation, aesthetic appreciation, creation, the vision of truth and beauty; in short, philosophy and art. And how are these things reached? He answers, again with Schopenhauer, only by means of leisure. And how is leisure possible, since man lives by the sweat of his brow? Only as some men produce more than they need, thereby freeing others from the necessity of labor. That is, leisure is the fruit of surplus labor (Nietzsche uses Marx's term, "*Mehr-Arbeit*").<sup>20</sup> And as men are not apt to render this labor willingly, as they naturally want all they produce, some kind of necessity or force must be used upon them. Whether this be force of law, or of competition among themselves for the chance to work, is immaterial. In either case the men are without choice, i.e. are slaves.<sup>21</sup> Nietzsche knows that the slavery of the "free laborer" of today is just as real as that of the legal slaves in the ancient world. On this shameful foundation, then, does the higher culture, philosophy, art, arise. Nietzsche says it in so many words: "Culture and art rest on a terrible foundation. In order that a wide, deep and fruitful soil may exist for their development, the vast majority must be in the service of a minority, must labor beyond the measure of their individual needs, be slaves of poverty. At their expense,

<sup>20</sup> Der Griechische Staat in Werke (Pock. ed.), I, 210; cf. 211, "Das Elend der mühsam lebenden Menschen muss noch gestiegen werden, um einer geringen Anzahl olympischer Menschen die Produktion der Kunstwelt zu ermöglichen," and Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 18, "die alexandrinische [i.e. Socratic, theoretical] Cultur brauchte einen Sklavenstand, um auf die Dauer existiren zu können."

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Nietzsche's express language later: "Sklave (wie wir vielleicht jeden geistigen und körperlichen Lohnarbeiter bezeichnen müssen)", Werke (Pock. ed.), V, xviii; also Professor Simmel's language quoted, xxiii, and Morgenröthe, p. 206.

by means of their surplus labor, must the few rise to freedom.”<sup>22</sup> It was so in ancient Greece (students of political science and political economy would do well to read his little paper on “The Greek State”). “To the nature of a higher culture slavery belongs;” and Nietzsche unflinchingly makes the statement, not at all because he favors slavery or fails to be outraged by it, but simply because he sees, or thinks he sees, the fact. Indeed, about the absolute worth of a scheme of things in which slavery can be necessary, there cannot in his estimation be two opinions. This world is not a divine world, and he praises Schopenhauer for squarely saying so.<sup>23</sup>

And yet there is no way out for mankind save through philosophy and art. The many must toil and suffer, and only incidentally for their personal good. They must live in relative darkness that a few may reach the light, though this will ultimately be of universal benefit. In other words, tragedy is inseparable from life at present; even those to whom the joy of life does come, the philosophers and artists, must live for ends beyond their personal selves, live to pass on their light and the beauty they create. And the highest man of all (for philosophy and art are at best preparatory), the saint, the hero-saint—he dies to himself absolutely, makes himself one with all, with their pain and suffering as well, marks out some great path for the good of all, and follows it unflinchingly and with firm-set face, like the knight in Dürer’s picture, riding along his frightful way with Death and the Devil for companions, to the bitter end. For, it should be distinctly said, Nietzsche in this period puts the saint or hero above the philosophers and artists; and no one, he holds,

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Werke, XII (8vo. ed.), 206 (p. 439), “Aber haltet immer fest, dass diese ungeheure Bemühung [of Fürsten, Kaufleute, Beamten, Ackerbauer, Soldaten], dieser Schweiss, Staub u. Arbeitslärm der Civilisation für die da ist, die dies alles zu benutzen wissen, ohne mitzuarbeiten: dass es *Ueberschüssige* geben muss, welche mit der allgemeinen Ueberarbeit erhalten werden, u. dass die Ueberschüssigen der Sinn u. die Apologie des ganzen Treibens sind!”

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the admiration he later expresses, but no doubt early felt, for Schopenhauer’s repudiation of theism or pantheism: “The un-divinity of existence was recognized by him as something given, tangible, indiscussable” (Fröhliche Wissenschaft, p. 359). Cf. “Der Atheismus war Das, was mich zu Schopenhauer führte” (Ecce Homo, “Die Unzeitgemässen,” p. 2).

makes such sacrifices, accepts such obligations,<sup>24</sup> so absolutely parts with all self-seeking, as he. He once formally compares three ideal types of men: the Rousseau ideal man, easily a blind revolutionist, the Goethe ideal man, who too easily accepts the world as it is, simply glorifying it by philosophy and art,<sup>25</sup> and the Schopenhauer ideal type, the hero and saint; and he puts the Schopenhauer ideal man on top. He praises Schopenhauer for making the saint the final arbiter and judge of existence. He says, not victory in this world, but tragic death may be the highest thing; as we actually feel when we listen to old Greek drama and are lifted to the thought of being other than we know of here.<sup>26</sup> Yes, in the saint he sees the consummation toward which all nature presses and strives; for the saint is he in whom and through whom nature, the blind egoistic will working everywhere, is redeemed from itself. He is the solver of the riddle of the world. With him indeed we all have affinities and ties. He is *in actu* what we are *in potentia*. He points to the redemption toward which we all may strive.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> From the start Nietzsche speaks of "Verpflichtungen" and "Pflichten" in a very different way from Schopenhauer (cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 8), though the difference may be more in language than in essential conception. Schopenhauer reacted against Kant's categorical imperative by going to an absurd opposite extreme.

<sup>25</sup> Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 7: he had said of the philosopher, "Denn das ist die eigenthümliche Arbeit aller grossen Denker gewesen, Gesetzgeber für Maass, Münze und Gewicht der Dinge zu sein" (*Ibid.*, p. 3); but above the philosopher he puts the saint.

<sup>26</sup> Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 21; cf. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 5, cf. II, 264-265, I, 155, 148 ("Wir glauben an das ewige Leben," so ruft die Tragödie"). Geburt der Tragödie, p. 16 ("Wir glauben an das ewige Leben," so ruft die Tragödie"); p. 17 ("am reinsten Tone vielleicht im Oedipus auf Kolonos der versöhnende Klang aus einer anderen Welt.").

<sup>27</sup> Cf. his recognition of Christianity: "Das Christenthum ist gewiss eine der reinsten Offenbarungen jenes Dranges nach Cultur und gerade nach der immer erneuten Erzeugung des Heiligen" (Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 6). In Die Geburt der Tragödie, p. 11, he shows appreciation of the deeper side of Christianity, as contrasted with the lightness and surface cheerfulness of the later Greek spirit, so different from the serious and almost sombre views of the sixth century B.C., quite in the manner of Schopenhauer. Cf. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, p. 2, where he speaks of Christianity as surpassing in the elevation of its ideal the ancient moral systems "und die in allen gleichmässig waltende Natürlichkeit"; though he admits at the same time that Christianity went so far that it produced a reaction, and hence the vacillation of the modern mind. It was in the midst of his own perplexity over ultimate problems that he came on Schopenhauer (in 1865), and found relief (*Ibid.*, p. 2).

Things being so, the whole aim at happiness is delusion. The final aim of our life is not in anything we can ourselves attain to, any passing success or satisfaction, but beyond us, above us, in producing or helping to produce those philosophers, artists, and saints through whom nature and man are redeemed; or, if we may, in producing the philosopher, artist, or saint in ourselves. "Humanity should continuously work to this end, to produce single great men; and this and nothing else is its task"—so Schopenhauer had said and so now Nietzsche after him. For such an end we are to strive; for it we are to make sacrifices. What accords with it is right; what clashes with it, wrong. Hence for every man to seek happiness, each in his own individual way, seems to Nietzsche folly. We do not exist for ourselves. The life of most of us has not significance enough to make it worth striving for as an end in itself. The purpose of our life is to serve higher life. In this way the lower gets a significance that it has not in itself.

Taken abstractly, a view like this may not offend us; but Nietzsche is in earnest with it. The slave class of ancient Greece did not exist for itself. How meaningless was their toil and drudgery, save as thereby Greek genius was set free! Suppose the slaves had risen and asserted their own individual rights to happiness, the "rights of man," as we say. Where would the age of Pericles have been? No more do the corresponding class, the working-class of today, exist for themselves; and Nietzsche comments on the unfortunate consequences in modern times of the general-happiness philosophy, that is, the idea that all may attain happiness on the earth, for culture, now as always, requires a class of virtual slaves as its foundation,<sup>28</sup> and if they rise, considering themselves wronged, culture will be destroyed.

<sup>28</sup> His sister says in summing up his views: "Man muss ohne Heuchelei zugeben, dass Sklaverei, oder wie man es nennen will, die schmachvolle und betrübliche Kehrseite *jeder* Civilisation ist! Man kann sie mildern, sie weniger schmerzhaft machen; man kann dem Knechte die Annahme seines Loses erleichtern—das Mittelalter mit seinen Feudal-System steht in dieser Hinsicht über der Neuzeit;—aber so lange es eine Gesellschaft giebt, wird es auch Mächtige und Privilegirte geben, deren Glück auf der Mühsal u. schweren Arbeit einer unterdrückten und zu ihren Gunsten ausgebeuteten Masse beruhen wird. Das sind harte Wahrheiten, welcher nur der tragische Mensch in aller Unerschrockenheit in's Auge zu sehen wagt" (Werke, Pock. ed., II, xxxi-xxxii).

"There is nothing more fearful," he declares, "than a barbaric slave-class that has come to consider its manner of existence a wrong, and sets about taking revenge not only for itself but for all generations." From the start, he had little sympathy with the spirit of the French Revolution or with present socialism: "*Der gute Urmensch will seine Rechte: welche paradiesischen Aussichten!*" he ironically exclaims. Let Nietzsche not be misunderstood. The business-classes do not exist for themselves, either. They think they do, indeed, and there is just the trouble, for they are on top now and do pretty much as they like. The economic doctrine of *laissez-faire* which these classes virtually inspire, works injuriously, Nietzsche holds, on the morality of whole peoples today. The egoism of these classes, particularly since the period of the Reformation (for before that time the church had been a more or less restraining force), has become one of the determining factors in modern life. It, along with the egoism of the military class, is to be reckoned among the coarsest and most evil influences that work upon us. The selfishness of the new industrial wealth perverts the aims of culture itself, looking on it as a means to its own gain and happiness. It opposes culture that has no industrial value. It thinks man has a right to happiness on earth, and needs education for this end, but only so far. Nietzsche speaks with scorn of the gold-aristocracy, the banking lords of our day without country or home, who use the State for their own ends, and so oppose war and even favor the masses against monarchs—patrons of peace and the people, forsooth! He questions the notion that wealth of itself prepares the way for culture. He satirizes the Germans after the Franco-Prussian War, who said, "Now let us become rich and self-conscious, and we shall have culture." Their wealth and surface-polish have been rather the foe of culture. Some kind of a surplus there must be, of course, but not, Nietzsche holds, the kind that is being piled up in modern communities. No, the business-classes, like the working-classes, have worth and dignity, in Nietzsche's view, as they serve ends beyond themselves, as they consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, are the helpmeets of genius, as they too contribute to the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint. If he recognizes the necessity



of slavery for the workingman, it is not as the business-man or the economist might do so. He is ever a son of the muses, not a Philistine.

Undoubtedly, a certain hardness and severity come to the fore here. It is the beginning of the characteristic Nietzschean note. Life is a difficult business, and there is no easy way out. If we take a great aim into ourselves, we must be hard to all that opposes it.<sup>29</sup> Softness, weakness, become folly and worse. Even cruelty may be necessary. Might, rule, says Nietzsche, is always ruthless. Something of cruelty lies in the nature (i.e., at the basis) of all culture. The state which made slavery law and continuous was cruel. Nietzsche speaks of the shameful origin of the state. Indeed here, in this first period, Nietzsche begins his revision of moral notions. We cannot, he says, aim at the happiness of others, singly or collectively, any more than at our own. The good of the greatest number, as we now find them, is not the ideal. The development of great communities and states is not the ideal. Why should the many be more valuable than one? he in effect asks, quite in the spirit of Heraclitus, who said that one man was in his eyes equal to ten thousand, if he was the best. The aim of life, according to Nietzsche, is, I repeat, to produce those perfect specimens of the race, who by philosophy and art and heroic self-transcendence will redeem the race; and the aim of society at any given moment is to find out and establish those conditions that are favorable to the emergence of this higher breed of men. This is the end, and there should be iron-hardness in seeking it. We may have sympathy with men; we must;<sup>30</sup> but not to the extent of interfering with the conditions and arrangements that are necessary to the attainment of the higher end. To attempt to make the working-class or the business-class happy

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Der Wille zur Macht*, 2d ed., p. 975: "Objektiv, hart, fest, streng bleiben im Durchsetzen eines Gedankens—das bringen die Künstler noch am besten zu Stande; wenn einer aber Menschen dazu nöthig hat (wie Lehrer, Staatsmänner u. s. w.), da geht die Ruhe und Kälte u. Härte schnell davon. Man kann bei Naturen wie Cäsar u. Napoleon etwas ahnen von einem 'interesselosen' Arbeiten an ihrem Marmor, mag dabei von Menschen geopfert werden, was nur möglich. Auf dieser Bahn liegt die Zukunft der höchsten Menschen, die *größte Verantwortlichkeit* tragen und *nicht* daran zerbrechen."

<sup>30</sup> "Die Weisheit wendet sich dem Gesamtbilde der Welt zu und sucht in diesem das ewige Leiden mit sympathischer Liebesempfindung zu ergreifen."

in the way each would like to be, to relieve the one of surplus labor and allow the other to get and to spend as they choose, is against the evolutionary law. They must endure, and we must endure. The condition of things makes this necessary, the nature of the world, where good is won by pain, and Prometheus, the fire-bringer, the friend of man, suffers. Relief is only in freely accepting the tragic view, willingly making sacrifice (if we don't willingly, we may have to unwillingly), and feeling beyond us and above us the heavens and infinite stars, a super-earthly and super-human order of things.

In the tribute to Schopenhauer which I have so often quoted—Schopenhauer, who with all his melancholy was to Nietzsche a good and brave fighter—Nietzsche imagines a disciple of culture saying, "I see something higher and more human above me than I myself am; help me all to attain it, as I will help every one who feels and suffers as I; in order that at last the man may arise who is full and measureless in knowledge and love and vision and power, and who with his whole being cleaves to nature and takes his place in nature as judge and valuer of things."<sup>31</sup> Plainly, it is a self-confession. It lets us into the inner nature and soul of the man. He changed in many ways; but from this central aspiration or prayer, if I may call it so, he never wavered.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Werke, II, 267. The translation of the latter part of this quotation is not literal; the German is: "Damit endlich wieder der Mensch entstehe, welcher sich voll und unendlich fühlt im Erkennen und Lieben, im Schauen und Können, und mit aller seiner Ganzheit an und in der Natur hängt, als Richter und Werthmesser der Dinge."

Cf. "Ich habe von Kindesbeinen an über die Existenzbedingungen des Weisen nachgedacht" (X, 183, p. 987).

<sup>32</sup> "Meine 'Unzeitgemässen' bedeuten für meine *Versprechungen*; was sie für Andere sind, weiss ich nicht. Man glaube mir, dass ich längst nicht mehr leben würde, wenn ich diesen Versprechungen nur um Einen Schritt breit ausgewichen wäre! Vielleicht kommt noch ein Mensch, der entdeckt, dass von 'Mensch. allem.' an ich nichts gethan habe, als mein Versprechen erfüllen" (XIV, 8vo ed., 381-382, p. 265).